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A month ago British political scientists noted that a “decade of constitutional debate” lay ahead for Britain [1].
Now, a month later, lawyers proclaim “that the Article 50 case may be the most important constitutional case for a
generation.” Both comments emphasise the importance of constitutional guidance at a time when the country is
struggling to agree on how to implement the referendum vote on Brexit.
As Article 50 TEU details: “Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own
constitutional requirements”[2]. Given the precedence of the situation not only in the United Kingdom but
Europe-wide, the interpretation of what exactly such constitutional guidance entails, matters crucially. An
acceptable solution to the procedural issues of the Brexit process would benefit from constitutional guidance.
The tense debate about whether or not Parliament should have a vote, and at which time (i.e. before or after
triggering the Article 50 procedure), that is currently present in all British media and social media shows that, if
anything, such guidance is lacking, as the constitutional framework leaves considerable margins for
interpretation.
Mistrust has been growing on either side of the conflicting parties. While Parliament demands the right to vote on
the matter, Government suspects that such a vote would seek to reverse the referendum outcome. In this
situation, ordinary citizens have turned to the courts for judicial review to rule whether or not Parliament should
be enabled to exercise their right to vote; and if so, when (i.e. before or after the Article 50 procedure is
triggered); and – importantly – whether or not the involved court documents should be made available to the
public. The case brought before the High Court by the “People’s Challenge” on the 13th of October
(CO/3809/2016 & CO/3281/2016) has already revealed that Prime Minister Theresa May intends to make use of
the ancient instrument of evoking royal prerogative power which effectively circumvents Parliament.
This comment holds that the current development suggests that not only the Brexit decision may become subject
to revision, but the uncodified constitution may become subject to scrutiny as well. So far, the absence of a
written constitution was generally viewed as a sign of “stability of the British polity.”[3] However, the Brexit
contestations may change that, and, on the long run, the status of an ‘unwritten’ or ‘uncodified constitution’ may
well come to an end. The present constitutional turn in British politics suggests that the long period of stability of
the British polity is challenged, just as the Brexit campaign promised the contrary. This comment demonstrates
why this is the case.
I argue that the court case has created a window of opportunity for politics and law. The window works in two
ways. First, along a more general political dimension, the court case puts Brexit onto the political agenda: by
turning it into a daily news item, the political class is forced to react. This attributes additional legitimacy to the
ongoing contestation about sovereignty in parliament. Second, with regard to more specific detail, the decision to
make all case documents available to the public sheds light on the issues raised by the contestants in court,
especially, the case made by the Government. Thus, the case has revealed that it is Prime Minister Theresa
May’s intention to take the decision about triggering the Article 50 procedure based on royal prerogative power.
Notably, the “defining characteristic of the prerogative is that its exercise does not require the approval of
Parliament.”[4] This specific power has rarely been evoked except for specific cases. According to the UK
government, in modern times it serves mainly to deal with citizenship issues claiming that, in their majority, Royal
Prerogative cases include the issuing (or refusal) of passports. As opposed to “executive prerogative” power,
royal prerogative power has traditionally been assigned to the monarch and was mainly used to declare war.
By revealing the May’s plan to use the royal prerogative, the Government’s mantra-like reiteration of a deep
respect for democratic principles, which demand acceptance of the referendum result,[5] suddenly appears
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questionable. As the Prime Minister seeks to circumvent Parliament, sovereignty in Parliament – another
constitutional principle that is deeply engrained in British constitutional practice, has been moved into the
spotlight.
The revelation regarding the use of the royal prerogative comes at a critical moment in British politics when the
public has been held back from contesting the referendum result, despite many good reasons to the contrary. In
effect, this decision means that the UK’s core constitutional of sovereignty in parliament has not only been
trumped by the fairness principle (i.e. accepting the result of the referendum) but it has been undermined from
above by the strategy of referral to the royal prerogative. While the principle of fairness vis-à-vis the referendum
result has so far been upheld by the British public including the leaders of the remain campaign, the top-down
instrument of the royal prerogative is likely to turn this acceptance around. This may come at considerable
political costs for the current Government. As attorney general Jeremy Wright QC admits: “This is not a narrow
legal challenge (…). It seeks to invalidate the decision already taken to withdraw from the EU.”[6]
In this situation, the claimants’ argument that “only parliament can lawfully ‘decide’ to leave the EU for the
purposes of article 50[of the treaty]; and that the [government] may only ‘notify’ such a decision to the European
council under article 50(2) once [it] has been properly authorized to do so by an act of parliament”[7] is gathering
momentum. The case has already generated wide public debate. According to the representative of the People’s
Challenge the “court’s order allows a floodlight to be shone on the government’s secret reasons for believing it
alone can bring about Brexit without any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.”[8] Given the decision to publicly
disclose the claim, notably and importantly, the arguments will not only be tested in court but they are now
available for public debate as well (Ibid.) This enhances the role of the current constitutional turn in the UK. The
development is particularly significant in light of a period of shock and inertia: Even though a number of
arguments could have been legitimately raised to contest the referendum result, for example, first, the
referendum is not legally binding; second, it was won by a tiny majority of 3.8%[9]; third, it was achieved based
on a campaign that was misleading the voters based on outright lies and false promises as admitted by the
leaders after the vote; forth, it led all of the leaders to resign in the aftermath of the vote; and fifth, it left the
political class largely clueless about strategies towards Brexit, the reactions of those who voted to remain in the
European Union have appeared as if in a state of inertia for the past four months. This was paired by a divided
political class and a Prime Minister who refused to “reveal her hand prematurely” on the Brexit negotiations.
The current legal case has changed this situation. It created a window of opportunity that enabled political
discussion from the bottom-up, and constrained political action on behalf of the political class. Crucial to this was
the September decision of the court that all documents were to be disclosed to the public. According to political
science, a window of opportunity opens when in a situation that appears to be locked in by formal constraints, an
unexpected change of context (for example, an external event, a major institutional change, or any event
causing politics to confront novel aspects) creates an opening for a political move. In the British post-referendum
context that was locked by the referendum result over the past four months, such an intervention was created by
the legal claim against triggering the Article 50 procedure before the British High Court of Justice. The
opportunity was considerably backed by the fact that the court ruled – against the interest of the Government –
for all court documents to be accessible to the public[10].
In the post-referendum and pre-Brexit debate in Britain the court case has created a political window of
opportunity both for the immediate interest of the remainers, and with regard to readjusting the legitimacy of
British EU politics. Four months into the post-referendum contestations, the details of the procedure that is to
trigger Article 50 has been challenged before the High Court of Justice. Known as the “People’s Challenge” to
the Government on Art. 50, this court case centres on nothing more and nothing less than the question of
whether, in the United Kingdom, sovereignty is held by individual voters only, or whether it is based in
Parliament. While voters are involved in both, a referendum means that political debate in order to clarify issues
with or contest the substantive meaning of an issue is placed before the vote and solely subject to campaigning.
By contrast, sovereignty in parliament means that the electorate votes for their representatives who then debate
about issues before taking a decision in parliament. With the case before the UK’s High Court of Justice for a
week, at the time of writing this comment, the discussion about sovereignty in parliament has been taken up by
the media and been picked up by public debate as presented by the press and social media.
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[1] See Simon Bulmer’s contribution to the discussion at the roundtable ‘The EU in Crisis’, UACES conference,
London 5th September 2016.
[2] See: Article 50, Treaty of European Union, Consolidated Version, 2010, 44 (emphasis added AW)
[3] As the Constitution Unit at the University of London explains, this meant that it “has never been thought
necessary to consolidate the basic building blocks of this order in Britain. What Britain has instead is an
accumulation of various statutes, conventions, judicial decisions and treaties which collectively can be referred to
as the British Constitution. It is thus more accurate to refer to Britain’s constitution as an ‘uncodified’ constitution,
rather than an ‘unwritten’ one.”
[4] See: Poole, Thomas, United Kingdom. The Royal Prerogative, International Journal of Constitutional Law
(2010) 8 (1): 146-155, at p 164
[5] As May reiterated again and again, „we are respecting the views of the British people.” See: Daily Mail, 8
September 2016.
[6] See The Guardian 17 October 2016 .
[7] The Guardian, 28th September 2016
[8] John Halford, a solicitor partner at Bindmans law firm, which represents the People’s Challenge (emphasis
added AW).
[9] The referendum was held on 23 rd June 2016 and won by a majority of 3.8% (equalling 1.269.501 or 51.9% of
the vote, based on a 72% voter turnout). For the detailed referendum data see here.
[10] According to Justice Cranston: “It is difficult to see justification for restricting publication of documents which
are generally available under the rules.”
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